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Abstract 
Literature assumes that negation is more difficult to understand than affirmation, but 
this might depend on the pragmatic context. The goal of this paper is to show that 
pragmatic knowledge modulates the unfolding processing of negation due to the 
previous activation of the negated situation. To test this, we used the visual world 
paradigm.  In this task, we presented affirmative (e.g., her dad was rich) and negative 
sentences (e.g., her dad was not poor) while viewing two images of the affirmed and 
denied entities. The critical sentence in each item was preceded by one of three types of 
contexts: an inconsistent context (e.g., She supposed that her dad had little savings) that 
activates the negated situation (a poor man), a consistent context (e.g., She supposed 
that her dad had enough savings) that activates the actual situation (a rich man), or a 
neutral context (e.g., her dad lived on the other side of town) that activates neither of the 
two models previously suggested. The results corroborated our hypothesis. Pragmatics 
is implicated in the unfolding processing of negation. We found an increase in fixations 
on the target compared to the baseline for negative sentences at 800 ms in the neutral 
context, 600 ms in the inconsistent context, and 1450 ms in the consistent context. Thus, 
when the negated situation has been previously introduced via an inconsistent context, 
negation is facilitated.  
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Negation in Context 
3 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The comprehension of language is context-dependent: its content depends not only on 
the syntactic and semantic properties of the types of expressions used, but also on facts 
about the situation in which the expressions are used (Stalnaker, 1998). Negative 
sentences do not point to the actual situation but to what is not the case. As a 
consequence, in their comprehension we must figure out what the speaker is referring 
to, and pragmatics becomes crucial. If someone tells us that their car is not red there 
should have been a reason to presume (or speculate) that it is red. Otherwise the utterer 
would have referred to the actual color of the car. In fact, individuals seem to use 
affirmation to communicate as default, but negation is often used in some specific 
contexts, and outside of these contexts negation is difficult to understand (Khemlani, 
Orenes, & Johnson-Laird, 2012).  
The representation and processing of negation has important implications for 
memory and language theories. Research has shown that negative sentences are more 
difficult to comprehend than their corresponding affirmatives: people take longer to 
understand negation and are likely to make more mistakes in processing negation (see 
Carpenter & Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972; Mayo, Schul, & Burnstein, 2004; 
Trabasso, Rollins, & Shaughnessy, 1971; Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972; Wason & 
Jones, 1963). Furthermore, negated concepts are less well recalled than affirmative ones 
(Fillenbaum, 1966; Lea & Mulligan, 2002; MacDonald & Just, 1989). These results 
would indicate that negative and affirmative information is processed and represented 
differently.  
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Among other explanations, Kaup, Lüdtke & Zwaan (2006) proposed a two-step 
simulation hypothesis to understand negation. For a negative such as the door is not 
open for example, individuals would first represent the negated situation; an open door; 
and then the actual situation: a closed door.  For an equivalent affirmative (e.g., the door 
is closed), the actual situation is directly available: a closed door (Kaup, Zwaan, & 
Lüdtke, 2007; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002). This two-step processing has been 
found in metaphors (Hasson & Glucksberg, 2006), quantifiers (Moxey & Sanford 
(1987), and counterfactuals (Byrne, 2005) among others. Within this framework, it has 
also been proposed that rather than a two-step sequence of static images, negation 
would be represented by the continuous-trajectory derivative over time in a perceptual 
simulation (Anderson, Huette, Matlock, Spivey, 2010; Huette, & Anderson, 2012; 
Huette, Anderson, Matlock, & Spivey, 2011; Tian, Breheny, & Ferguson, 2010). 
Despite this, many studies have also shown that when negation is presented in an 
adequate context, it can be similar to affirmation (Dale & Duran, 2011; Givon, 1978; 
Glenberg, Robertson, Jansen & Johnson-Glenberg, 1999; Johnson-Laird & Tridgell, 
1972; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008; Strawson, 1952; Wason, 1972). The question that 
remains unsolved to date is what makes a context ‘adequate’ for understanding 
negation. Wason (1965) proposed that negation is easier to understand when it is used to 
communicate deviations from expectations (see also Givon, 1978). In this case, 
negation may be easier to understand because the negated situation has been constructed 
already (Khemlani et al., 2012). For example, Lüdtke & Kaup (2006) presented a 
context (e.g., that a boy´s T-shirt is dirty after he played outside in the backyard) that 
activates the negated situation (e.g., a dirty t-shirt) previously, and the processing of 
negation (e.g., the T-shirt was not dirty) was facilitated. It seems then, that the difficulty 
of negation is due to the change of attention (or deviation) from the negated concept 
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toward the actual situation. However, when the negated concept is previously activated 
in an adequate context, its processing is facilitated.  
The visual world paradigm allows us to study the unfolding process of 
comprehending negation. In a typical visual world task verbal and visual inputs are 
presented simultaneously while the participants’ eye movements are recorded. Eye 
movements provide an index of real time processing that most other methodologies do 
not offer, and they are sensitive to subtle aspects of language, attention and memory 
(Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998; Duñabeitia, Avilés, Afonso, Scheepers & 
Carreiras, 2009; Rayner, 1998). From the literature, it is expected that when something 
is heard, it is processed and attended to automatically. At the same time, if the object is 
visible, the eyes begin to move towards the corresponding object (Cooper, 1974; 
Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard & Sedivy, 1995). It follows that when people 
are exposed to negative assertions in a visual world paradigm, they will look more 
frequently at the most active information in working memory.  
Our main goal in the present study is to test the role of context in the process of 
understanding negation. Our hypothesis is that certain contexts can activate the negated 
concept before the negation is encountered. This is consistent with Khemlani et al. 
(2012) who, based on Wason (1965), pointed out that negation is easier when the 
negated situation has been constructed previously within the context. First, we presented 
affirmative (e.g., her dad was rich) and negative sentences (e.g., her dad was not poor) 
in a neutral context (e.g., her dad lived on the other side of town), and we expected to 
find the classical effect of negation: negative sentences takes longer to process than 
affirmative sentences. This effect could be reduced in a context in which the negated 
situation has been constructed previously, what we have labeled an inconsistent context 
(e.g., She supposed that her dad had little savings).  This context activates the negated 
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situation (e.g., her dad was poor). In a third condition, we presented a consistent context 
sentence (e.g., She supposed that her dad had enough savings) that activates the actual 
situation (e.g., her dad was rich) followed by the affirmative (e.g., her dad was rich) or 
the negative sentence (e.g., her dad was not poor). While the affirmative statement is 
directly understood after the context sentence, understanding of the negative statement 
requires listeners to represent a rich man after hearing the context, and then a poor man 
after hearing negation (not poor), and finally the rich man again. These extra steps 
required to understand negation will take time compared to affirmation. Therefore, the 
consistent context is expected to be the most difficult one for negation (see Johnson-
Laird & Tridgell, 1972). The extra processing in the consistent context condition should 
be reflected in the eye movement because people need to change their focus of attention 
twice from the rich man to the poor man, and from the poor man to the rich man in our 
example.   
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
Fifty native Spanish speakers from the University of La Laguna, Tenerife (Spain), 
participated in the experiment in exchange for course credits. All of them had normal 
vision or wore soft contact lenses or glasses.  
 
Materials  
Forty-eight experimental vignettes of simple events were heard. The first two sentences 
in each vignette described a general situation (e.g., Veronica needed a new car for work. 
She wondered whether her dad could help her financially). The second sentence in each 
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vignette presented a context. This sentence was always stated as a presupposition by 
using reported speech forms (he supposed, she thought, etc.) so that there was no a-
priori contradiction with the subsequent affirmative or negative sentences. The context 
could be consistent (e.g., She supposed that her dad had enough savings), inconsistent 
(e.g., She supposed that her dad had little savings) or neutral (e.g., her dad lived on the 
other side of town) with respect to the target part of the story in the final sentence that 
consisted of an affirmative (e.g., her dad was rich) or a negative sentence (e.g., her dad 
was not poor).  
 
“(Figure 1 about here)” 
 
For each trial, a different display with two images appeared on the screen. For 
example, an image of a poor man on the left and a rich man on the right (see Figure 1). 
The position of each image was counterbalanced across conditions. The order of the 
materials was randomized, and 12 versions of the full set of materials were prepared: 
each context (consistent, inconsistent, and neutral) was combined with the two types of 
sentences (affirmative and negative) and the two poles of the adjective contraries (e.g., 
poor-rich), so that only one of the 12 possible versions of each experimental item 
occurred in each presentation file (see Table 1). In total, there were 8 experimental trials 
in each of six conditions: consistent-affirmative, consistent-negative, inconsistent-
affirmative, inconsistent-negative, neutral-affirmative, and neutral-negative. For all 
trials, the analysis of fixations was time-locked to the onset of the critical adjective in 
the target sentence, that is, ‘rich’ in an affirmative sentence such as her dad was rich 
and ‘poor’ in a negative sentence such as her dad was not poor. 
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“(Table 1 about here)” 
 
Apparatus and Procedure 
Participants’ eye movements were recorded at a rate of 500 Hz using an SR Research 
EyeLink II head-mounted eye-tracker connected to a 21-inch color CRT for visual 
stimulus presentation. Procedures were implemented in SR Research Experiment 
Builder. Calibration and validation procedures were carried out at the beginning of the 
experiment and repeated several times per session. Trials started with the presentation 
of a central fixation dot for drift correction while participants listened to the general 
situation and the context (consistent, inconsistent, or neutral). After that, a display with 
two images appeared for 2 seconds and then the story finished with the presentation of 
an affirmative or negative sentence that was the target. The trial concluded with the 
appearance of a written question (e.g. did Veronica need a new car?) which participants 
had to answer by pressing either a “yes” or a “no” button. There was a practice block of 
four trials before the experiment proper started. The entire experiment lasted 
approximately 30 minutes. 
 
Results 
 
The eye-movement data generated by the EyeLink system were analyzed as follows. 
First, bitmap templates were created for identifying regions of interest in each display 
(e.g., a rich and a poor man). The object regions were defined in terms of rectangles 
containing the relevant objects; fixations landing within the perimeters of these 
rectangles were coded as fixations on the relevant objects. The output of the eye-tracker 
included the x- and y-coordinates of participant fixations, which were converted into 
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region of interest codes using the templates. Fixations shorter than 80 ms (accounting 
for ca. 0.2% of all fixations) were pooled with preceding or following fixations if they 
were within 0.5 degrees of visual angle. Times for blinks were added to the immediately 
preceding fixations. The analyzed time period was from the onset of the target to 3000 
ms after the target word (as established on a by-trial basis). This time window was 
chosen to guarantee there was enough time to comprehend negations (e.g., Kaup, 
Lüdtke, & Zwaan, 2006; Lüdtke, Friedrich, Filippis & Kaup, 2008). This period was 
further divided into 50 ms time slots. For each time slot, the number of fixations on the 
target image was divided by the sum of the fixations on the target and competitor 
image, yielding fixation probabilities for the target image. Since eye-blinks, off-screen 
fixations, and empty-space fixations together accounted for no more than 6% of the data 
at any given point in time, proportions of looks to the competitor image were more or 
less complementary to proportions of looks to the target image. 
 
“(Figure 2.1 about here)” 
 
 
Figure 2 depicts probabilities of fixations on the target region of interest as a 
function of time and context. Figure 2.1 corresponds to the neutral context, where 
people heard a context that was not related to the critical sentence (or target). For 
example, ‘Her dad lived on the other side of town’. In this case the context does not 
favour any of the images that are shown on the screen, therefore listeners initially look 
at both images equally often. When participants listened to the affirmative sentence, e.g. 
‘Her dad was rich’ and the negative sentence, e.g. ‘Her dad was not poor’, fixation 
probabilities on the target interpretation image increased (e.g. the rich man), but this 
increase was earlier for affirmative sentences than for negative sentences.   
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“(Figure 2.2 about here)” 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the data for the inconsistent context condition, where 
participants heard the critical affirmative or negative sentence following a context that 
was inconsistent with what was mentioned in the critical sentence. As can be seen, 
people started to look at the target interpretation image earlier in the affirmative than in 
the negative sentence condition.   
 
“(Figure 2.3 about here)” 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the data for the consistent context condition. In this context, 
affirmative (e.g., her dad was poor after She supposed that her dad had little savings), 
and negative sentence (e.g., Her dad was not poor after She supposed that her dad had 
enough savings) ultimately led to the same pattern of fixations. The difference is in the 
timing: participants fixate on the target more quickly following an affirmative compared 
to a negative statement.   
 
T-test against baseline  
To avoid problems inherent to proportional data, participant and item averages were 
arcsin-transformed prior to t-test comparisons. Given that 180-200 ms are usually 
assumed to account for saccade programming (Martin, Shao, & Boff, 1993), the mean 
of the first time-region (0 - 100 ms) was considered to be the baseline and was used to 
conduct statistical comparisons against means on each time point until 3000 ms later 
(for a similar method, see Huettig & Altmann, 2010). This correction to baseline 
allowed us to control for any bias in the pattern of fixations on figures caused by the 
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type of context. A False Discovery Rate (FDR) thresholding procedure was used to 
effectively control for the type 1 error due to multiple comparisons (58 for each 
condition; Genovese, Lazar, & Nichols, 2002). We eliminated one subject due to 
problems in the recording of her eye movements. 
In the neutral context, there was an increase in fixation on the target 
interpretation for affirmative sentences at 500 ms (pFDRcorr1=.011(subject analysis); 
pFDRcorr2=.031(item analysis)) and for negative sentences at 800 ms 
(pFDRcorr1=.007; pFDRcorr2=.001). In the inconsistent context, the significant 
differences with respect to the baseline started at 500 ms for affirmative sentences 
(pFDRcorr1=.016; pFDRcorr2=.002) and at 600 ms for negative sentences 
(pFDRcorr1=.014; pFDRcorr2=.025). It is important to keep in mind that while 
affirmative sentences are processed similarly in both contexts, negative sentences are 
facilitated in the inconsistent context when the negated situation is already constructed. 
In the consistent context condition, there was an increase in fixation on the target 
interpretation starting at 650 ms (pFDRcorr1=.002; pFDRcorr2=.006) for affirmative 
sentences, while there was a decrease in fixation on the target interpretation at the 
beginning, at the temporal point of 800 ms, (pFDRcorr1=.048; and between 450 and 
700 ms in the item analysis: pFDRcorr2=.028) and then there was an increase in 
fixation starting at 1450-1550 ms (pFDRcorr1=.039; and from 2000 ms in the item 
analysis pFDRcorr2=.047) for negative sentences.  In this last context, we can see that 
participants needed to build first the negated situation around 800 ms because it has not 
been constructed previously and then, the actual situation around 1450 ms. In 
conclusion, pragmatic information clearly has an influence on the process of 
understanding negations. 
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The growth-curve analysis 
This analysis is a multilevel regression technique designed for analysis of time course 
with orthogonal power polynomials (see Mirman, Dixon, & Magnuson, 2008). First, we 
modeled the effect of polarity separately for each verbal context. With this method, we 
can examine if the differences between affirmative and negative sentences lay at the 
intercept (which would reflect differences between overall fixation ratios), at the linear 
term (which would reflect differences at a monotonic change in fixation ratios), and at 
the quadratic term (which would reflect differences at the symmetric rise and fall rate of 
fixation ratios around a central inflection point). Second, we modeled whether 
differences between affirmative and negative sentences varied across contexts. We 
report a deviance statistic, often called -2LL (minus 2 times the log-likelihood), the 
changes in deviance (AD), and the p-value. The change in deviance allows us to test 
whether including the parameter increases the fit of the model (see Table 2).  
 The results of Table 2 show that affirmative and negative sentences differed 
significantly across contexts. In the neutral context, there was a significant effect at the 
intercept, which indicates that fixation on the target interpretation was higher for 
affirmative sentences than for negative sentences. There was also a difference at the 
linear term (slope), reflecting a different increase in fixation for affirmative and 
negative sentences. That is, while affirmative sentences increased at 500 ms, negative 
sentences increased at 800 ms. The inconsistent context had significant effects on the 
linear and the quadratic terms. These effects reflect that affirmative sentences had a 
steeper slope, while affirmative sentences increased at 500 ms, negative sentences 
increased at 600 ms. The largest effect was on the quadratic term. That is, the difference 
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between affirmative and negative sentences was primarily in the rise and fall of the 
fixation probability curves. Figure 2.2. shows that the temporal location of the peak is 
around 1000 ms for affirmative sentences and 1500 ms for negative sentences. In the 
consistent context, we only found differences between affirmative and negative 
sentences in the quadratic term. This result reflects differences in the rise and fall of 
fixation proportions between affirmative and negative sentences. Figure 2.3. shows that 
participants decreased their attention on the target around 400 ms (the peak) and then, 
they increased their attention, with the temporal location of the peak around 700ms for 
affirmative sentences. However, the proportions are different for negative sentences, 
where the lowest peak was around 700 ms and the highest peak was around 2500 ms. 
On the other hand, the differences between affirmative and negative sentences varied 
across contexts in the quadratic term. This indicates that the main difference between 
contexts is in the distribution proportion rather than the intercept or slope. To sum up, 
these results indicate that affirmative and negative sentences result in different target 
fixation profiles across all contexts. 
 
“(Table 2 about here)” 
 
Discussion 
 
The results are consistent with the view that pragmatic knowledge influences the 
process of understanding negation. We found an increase in fixation compared to the 
baseline on the target for negative sentences at 800 ms in the neutral context condition, 
600 ms in the inconsistent context condition, and 1450 ms in the consistent context 
condition. These differences are smaller for affirmative sentences, at around 500 ms in 
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the neutral and inconsistent context condition, and at around 650 ms in the consistent 
context condition. Therefore, it seems that pragmatic information, as manipulated in this 
experiment, modulates the unfolding processing of negation more than of affirmation. 
On the other hand, our results show that negative sentences are always slower to 
process than affirmation regardless of context. This finding is at odds with many studies 
that indicate that negation and affirmation can be processed in a similar way (Dale & 
Duran, 2011; Givon, 1978; Glenberg et al., 1999; Johnson-Laird & Tridgell, 1972; 
Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008; Strawson, 1952; Wason, 1972).  That is, while our 
results have shown that pragmatic information can indeed aid the processing of 
negation, the latter still remained more difficult to process than affirmation regardless of 
context. This could suggest that, compared to other methods, visual world eye-tracking 
data may be more sensitive to subtle, context-independent processing differences 
between affirmative and negative sentences.   
In the neutral context, we found the classical effect of negation (see Carpenter & 
Just, 1975; Clark & Chase, 1972; Mayo et al., 2004; Trabasso et al., 1971; Wason & 
Johnson-Laird, 1972; Wason & Jones, 1963). Growth-curve analysis revealed an effect 
at the intercept, indicating that fixations on the target were more likely (within the 
considered time period) for affirmative sentences than for negative sentences. More 
importantly, there was also a difference in the linear term, reflecting differential 
increases in target fixation probability over time for affirmative (at ca. 500 ms) and 
negative sentences (at ca. 800 ms).  That is, participants were mainly slower to attend to 
the target in negative than in affirmative sentences (see also: Orenes, Beltrán, & 
Santamaría, 2014). This finding could be related to the fact that negated concepts are 
less readily recalled than affirmative ones (Fillenbaum, 1966; Lea & Mulligan, 2002; 
MacDonald & Just, 1989).  
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In the consistent context, participants heard the negative sentence Her dad was 
not poor after hearing She supposed that her dad had enough savings. In this case, 
participants switched their attention from the image of the rich man (after hearing the 
context) toward the image of the poor man (after hearing negation) 800 ms after hearing 
the critical word (‘poor’). After that, they switched their visual attention again from the 
poor man towards the rich man (at around 1450 ms). These two computations take extra 
time (see also Johnson-Laird & Tridgell, 1972). It is interesting to note that a 
comparable increase in the number of fixations on the target started at around 650 ms 
from critical word-onset in affirmative sentences. This delay in comparison to the other 
context conditions may be due to the target not being very informative, that is, it 
confirms information already suggested by the context. As the theory of relevance 
purports, communication must be relevant (Grice 1961; Wilson & Sperber, 2004); 
however, in the consistent context condition, after listening to for example, She 
supposed that her dad had little savings, listeners already inferred that her dad must 
have been poor, thus when they actually heard the affirmative Her dad was poor, this 
information was less relevant in the sense that participants already knew it. As a result, 
(re-)inspecting the target was somewhat delayed.  
The process of understanding negation is facilitated when the negated situation 
has been presented previously (Givon, 1978; Khemlani et al., 2012; Lüdtke & Kaup, 
2006; Wason, 1965), but it is still more difficult than understanding affirmation. This 
suggests that the differences between negative and affirmative sentences are not purely 
pragmatic. In the inconsistent context, in which the negated situation was presented 
previously, we found differences in the linear term, reflecting a different increase in 
fixation for affirmative (at around 500 ms) and negative sentences (at around 600 ms). 
There was also a difference in the quadratic term, reflecting differences at rise and fall 
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in fixation proportions between affirmative and negative sentences. That is, the highest 
peak happened around 1000 ms for affirmative sentences ms and around 1500 ms for 
negative sentences. 
The advantage of using the visual world paradigm is that this method allows us 
to see how people update their current interpretations online while processing negation 
within different contexts. For example, when participants were focused on the poor man 
image after hearing the inconsistent context, and then they heard: he was not poor, they 
switched toward the target image (the rich man) at 600 ms. However, as they were 
focused on both images equally often in the neutral context, when they heard: he was 
not poor, they switched toward the rich man target image with a delay compared to the 
inconsistent context, at 800 ms. The visual world paradigm was therefore sensitive 
enough to detect the effect of pragmatic. 
It is interesting to note that affirmative and negative sentences were easier when 
they were used to deny a false belief (inconsistent context) than when no prior beliefs 
were established (neutral context) because previous literature suggests that once beliefs 
are held, they should be difficult to change. That is, people tend to maintain their beliefs 
even when faced with evidence to the contrary (Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2012; 
Orenes, Navarrete, Beltrán & Santamaría, 2012). Based on this premise, one could 
predict that when people listen to a context that is inconsistent with the target, the latter 
must be processed more slowly (see Ferguson, Sanford, & Leuthold, 2008). However, 
our results show that both affirmative and negative sentences are processed more 
quickly in the inconsistent context (when they are used to deny or change a belief) than 
in a neutral context. This could probably be due to a priming effect. In our experiment, 
we presented a context that led to a prediction, for example whether the critical 
protagonist (‘her dad’) was rich or poor. Given the context She supposed that her dad 
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had little savings, for example, there is a prediction that ‘her dad’ is poor.  In the 
inconsistent condition, this was then rejected with ‘her dad was not poor’. The neutral 
context Her dad lived on the other side of town makes no such prediction about the 
critical protagonist’s financial status. As Khemlani and collaborators (2012) pointed 
out, individuals should find it easier to understand a negation if they have already 
constructed the models of the corresponding affirmative assertion. 
In conclusion, pragmatic information influences the processing of negation more 
than affirmation, especially when the negated situation is already constructed, but it 
does not explain all of the difference in difficulty between negative and affirmative 
sentences. Negation is, clearly, a complex phenomenon and further research should be 
conducted to its apprehension.   
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Example of a display with two images, one corresponds to a poor man and 
another to a rich man. 
 
Figure 2.1 Probabilities of fixations on the target interpretation image (the rich man) 
over time, separately for affirmative and negative sentences within neutral contexts. 
Before the onset of the target word (t < 0), participants focused on both images about 
equally frequently because the context was neutral. From about 500 ms after target word 
onset, probabilities of fixations on the target interpretation image started to increase for 
affirmative and negative sentences. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
within subjects such that no overlap between conditions indicates a significant 
difference (see Morey, 2008; O´Brien & Cousineau, 2014).  
 
Figure 2.2 Probabilities of fixations on the target interpretation image (the rich man) 
over time, separately for affirmative and negative sentences within inconsistent 
contexts. In this context, we observed that participants changed from initially preferring 
the poor man (considerably less than 50% of fixations on the target interpretation image 
early on) to the rich man after hearing the critical word. As the two curves indicate, this 
happened earlier in affirmative than in negative sentences. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals within subjects such that no overlap between conditions indicates a 
significant difference (see Morey, 2008; O´Brien & Cousineau, 2014).  
 
Figure 2.3 Probabilities of fixations on the target interpretation image (the rich man) 
over time, separately for affirmative and negative sentences within consistent contexts. 
 
Negation in Context 
24 
 
In this context, we observed that participants were already biased towards the target 
interpretation image early on (around 70% of fixations were on the target interpretation 
image before the critical word was heard). In both conditions, proportions of looks to 
the target first dropped to around 60%, and then rose towards an asymptote of around 
80% after processing the critical word. This rise towards asymptote happened much 
earlier in the affirmative than in the negative sentence condition. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals within subjects such that no overlap between conditions 
indicates a significant difference (see Morey, 2008; O´Brien & Cousineau, 2014).  
 
 
Table 1. Examples of experimental sentences 
Veronica needed a new car for work. She wondered whether her dad could help her financially.  
Consistent-Affirmative:  She supposed that her dad had little savings.  
Her dad was poor. Version 1.  
She supposed that her dad had enough savings.  
Her dad was rich. Version 2.  
Consistent-Negative:  She supposed that her dad had enough savings.  
Her dad was not poor. Version 3.  
She supposed that her dad had little savings.  
Her dad was not rich. Version 4.  
Inconsistent-Affirmative:  She supposed that her dad had enough savings.  
Her dad was poor. Version 5.  
She supposed that her dad had little savings.  
Her dad was rich. Version 6.  
Inconsistent-Negative:  She supposed that her dad had little savings.  
Her dad was not poor. Version 7.  
She supposed that her dad had enough savings.  
Her dad was not rich. Version 8.  
Neutral-Affirmative:  Her dad lived on the other side of town.  
Her dad was poor. Version 9.  
Her dad lived on the other side of town.  
Her dad was rich. Version 10.  
Neutral-Negative:  Her dad lived on the other side of town.  
Her dad was not poor. Version 11.  
Her dad lived on the other side of town.  
Her dad was not rich. Version 12.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. GCA results of the comparisons between affirmative and negative conditions 
within each context and of the comparison of the polarity effect (affirmative minus 
negative) across contexts. 
Model -2LL AD p  
Neutral Context  
Base   69,898.61
Intercept  69,894.01 4.60 .032  
Linear  69,865.69 28.32 <.001  
Quadratic  69,862.95 2.74 .097  
Inconsistent Context  
Base  70,355.92 
Intercept  70,355.04 0.88 .348  
Linear  70,345.93 9.11 .002  
Quadratic  70,327.16 18.77 <.001  
Consistent Context  
Base  69,622.72 
Intercept  69,622,72 0 .947  
Linear  69,620.60 2.12 .146  
Quadratic  69,575.04 45.56 <.001  
Contexts  
Base  110,835.6 
Intercept  110,835 0.6 .74  
Linear  110,829 6.00 .0505  
Quadratic  110,816.9 12.1 .002  
 
 
  
  
  
  
